My interest in this essay is an advance in the use of pragmatics to explain what were considered to be syntactical or semantical phenomena. The case in question is the explanation of the licensing of Negative Polarity Items. The data are not sentence-types but rather utterance-types and utterance-tokens. The explanatory concepts are the distinctions between assertions and non-assertions, between sentence-meanings and speaker's meanings. I shall examine the most ingenious example of such a pragmatic theory that I know and ask whether the arguments that have so far been used in its support are adequate to their task. The doubts that I raise do not show that the pragmatic theory cannot succeed, but they suggest that other theoretical constructions will be necessary for the proper defense of a pragmatic theory.
, in response to Atlas (1984 Atlas ( , 1997 Atlas ( , 2005 , claims that adverbials like almost and not quite may both be analyzed into two semantic components; x almost Fs means x is close to F and x does not F and x does not quite F also means x is close to F and x does not F. However, the first, "proximal" conjunct and the second, "polar" conjunct are not pragmatically on all-fours. There is a difference in the pragmatics of almost and not quite (Sadock 1981: 264; Atlas 1984 Atlas , 2005 . For example, in (1a,b) the speaker'smeaning in (1a) is typically (1a'), and in (1b) is typically (1b').
(1) a. It's too bad you almost died in the accident [ --now you'll need therapy]. a'. It's too bad you came close to dying in the accident. b. It's too bad you didn't quite die in the accident [--now I'll have to finish you off]. b'. It's too bad you did not die in the accident. c. I {never quite / *almost} made it to any of your parties.
In the almost assertion the speaker's meaning is the proximal conjunct and in the not quite assertion the speaker's meaning is the "polar" conjunct. Furthermore in (1c) never quite licenses the Negative Polarity Item (NPI) any, but almost does not license it. Why, given their equivalence in sense (truth-conditions), according to Horn, should one license a NPI and the other not? The explanation of the difference in speaker meanings and in the licensing of NPIs requires an asymmetry, according to Horn: not quite speaker-means not while almost speaker-means close to. The claim is that NPIs must be licensed by what the speaker asserts, not by the literal meanings of the expressions. Thus NPI licensing is not a grammatical, sentence phenomenon. Instead, Horn (2002: 62) claims:
Semantically entailed material that is outside the scope of the asserted, and hence potentially controversial (Stalnaker 1978) , aspect of utterance-meaning counts as assertorically inert and hence as effectively transparent to NPI-licensing… What is relevant to NPI licensing is "downward assertion" rather than downward entailment; in the case of not quite, the asserted content is a downward-entailing proposition, but in the case of almost, the asserted content is not a downward-entailing proposition. Thus we explain (1c); the pragmatic, assertoric content of not quite, not its sense, is negative and so licenses a Negative Polarity Item.
The accounts of the semantics and the pragmatics of almost and not quite to be found in Atlas (1984 Atlas ( , 1997 Atlas ( , 2005 differ from Horn's account. Horn puts himself in this theoretical position, in part, by the semantic equivalence that he posits for almost F and not quite F and by the assumption that downward monotonic items are required to license NPIs. If he cannot get the downward monotonicity from the sense of the expression-type, he will have to get it from the speaker's meaning communicated by the assertoric use of the expression-token.
Another case for distinguishing the pragmatic force of the meaning components of an expression has been made for only sentences. Horn's (2002: 70) long-standing objection to symmetrical conjunction analyses like Socrates runs and no one other than Socrates runs for Only Socrates runs is that they offer, he believes, no explanation of why the positive component of the only sentence (the prejacent) is "marginally suspendable" while the negative component is not -see (2a,b); why only-initial phrases trigger negative inversion -see (3a,b); or why the nuclear scope of only should license Negative Polarity Items -see (4).
(2) a. Only Ann will pay her taxes on time, and #(maybe) even she won't. b. # Only Ann paid her taxes on time, {and/but} maybe someone else did.
(3) a. Only in stories does a dropped glass betray agitation. (Graham Greene) b. Only one new feature did I notice in the landscape, a large white villa.
(4) Only young writers ever accept suggestions with any sincerity. (Klima 1964) The evidence in (2) -(4) originally suggested an asymmetric analysis in which the positive component was not entailed but semantically presupposed, or conventionally implicated, or pragmatically presupposed, or conversationally implicated. Horn (2002:70) remarks:
Both liberal and radical asymmetricalist approaches fall afoul of Atlas's observation (1991 Atlas's observation ( , 1993 Horn (2002: 72) proposes a pragmatic theory of NPI licensing: though only NP statements entail both conjuncts, they assert only the negative one. He adapts the scopediagnostics for "conventional implicature" (presupposition) to be found in Karttunen and Peters (1979) and uses them as diagnostics for "non-assertion." And he most interestingly proposes (Horn 2002: 73) : that (a) Karttunen and Peters (1979) diagnostics demonstrate what's outside the scope of assertion, and (b) NPIs are sensitive to downward assertion, not downward entailment as such. Horn ( , 2005 Horn ( , 2006 He has also granted the failure of (7a) to entail (7b).
(7) a. Only Socrates entered the race. b. Only Socrates entered the race early.
Thus, he grants that Only Socrates is not downward entailing and so fails to meet the downward monotonicity condition required by Ladusaw (1980) for a generalized quantifier Noun Phrase (NP) to license the grammatical co-occurrence of Negative Polarity Items --as in (8a), with the "weak" NPI ever, and in (b,c), with "minimizer" NPIs. It is the minimizer data (8b), (8c) and weak NPI datum (8a) that persuade Horn (2002: 71) that only NP must be "negative." Since 
now admits that the affirmative proposition Muriel voted for Hubert is ENTAILED by Only Muriel voted for
Hubert, his dilemma is this: Only Muriel voted for Hubert is not downward entailing, but it is still "negative," since it licenses some NPIs. How do we make a non-downwardentailing generalized quantifier "negative"?
The characterization of Muriel voted for Hubert as a "presupposition" was, Horn (1979 Horn ( , 1992 once thought, justified by the diagnostics for presupposition by Karttunen and Peters (1979) . Karttunen and Peters gave an account of (9a) whereby the truthconditions of "what (9a) says" is expressed by (9b) and the further commitments of an asserter of (28a) are to the presuppositions/ "conventional implicata" (9c) and (9d), which are not asserted in the asserting of (9a) (Karttunen and Peters 1979: 12 But the presuppositions/ "conventional implicata" in (9c) and (9d) are allegedly inherited by (10a), and the assertion of (10a) commits the speaker to the truth of (9c) and (9d) as much as the assertion of (9a) does.
It is notable that the contrast between "what is presupposed" in asserting a sentence and "what is asserted" or "what is meant" plays a crucial role in the description of Karttunen and Peters's linguistic intuitions. Their claim that (10a) asserts just (10b) -not (10c-e) --is a strong one. Karttunen and Peters take presuppositions/ "conventional implicata" to determine felicity conditions on assertions and thus to contribute to the "pragmatic presuppositions" of the utterance.
Horn's most recent proposal is to take the Karttunen-Peters observations as drawing a distinction between "what is asserted" and "what is not asserted." Thus he asks whether an assertion of (12a) asserts (12b) or (12c). (11) Horn has plausibly claimed that an assertion of (12a) just "means," or asserts (12c). So he believes that the negative content of an only Proper Name sentence is assertorically "foregrounded" and its affirmative content presuppositionally "back-grounded." This is admittedly a natural interpretation of an assertion of (12a). Further, consider (13): (13) Once again Horn's intuition that a natural interpretation of an assertion of (13a) expresses the foregrounded proposition (13c) seems plausible. Now, for the moment, let us suppose these Karttunen-Peters-Horn claims are unproblematic. How does Horn use these observations to resolve the dilemma created by his admitting that Only  Fs entails  Fs and that only  is non-monotonic? It is not downwards entailing, but it licenses some NPIs and so, on Horn's view, something in it must be "negative." suggests that, though Only  Fs entails  Fs, assertoric utterances of the sentence assert No one distinct from  Fs but do not assert  Fs. IF -and that is a large 'if' -the licensing of Negative Polarity Items depends on "what is asserted" in an utterance, and the asserted utterance-meaning is downwards entailing, then the conventional hypothesis of NPI licensing by a downwards entailing, and so logically negative, generalized quantifier NP can be preserved from the refutation offered by Atlas's (1991 Atlas's ( , 1993 Atlas's ( , 1996 Atlas's ( , 1997 (Searle (1969) ).
It is, at the least, mildly ironic that Horn, after rejecting the conjunction analysis Fs & no one distinct from  Fs for Only  Fs in Horn (1969 Horn ( ), (1979 , (1992), should -in Horn (2002) --adopt a subtle version of a traditional conjunction analysis in (15a) consisting of a "presupposition" conjoined with an asserted content (truth-conditions). The second representation in (15b) is akin to Horn's (1996) view that when one asserts Only Muriel voted for Hubert, Someone voted for Hubert is "accommodated" (Lewis 1979) ; the accommodated proposition, when combined with the negative truth-conditions of the assertion, entails Muriel voted for Hubert. The propositional contents of (15a) and (15b) are logically equivalent.
But, unlike the view of Horn (1996) , Horn cannot now take the view that Someone voted for Hubert is accommodated. Accommodation introduces in real time, as an assertion is made, an "unpresupposed" presupposition-like proposition into the common ground in order that the assertion be "acceptable," or "felicitous," in the context of utterance. In order to secure the entailment of Muriel voted for Hubert, the proposition Someone voted for Hubert cannot be the content of a felicity condition, or a pragmatic presupposition, of the assertion of Only Muriel voted for Hubert, since the necessity of a semantic entailment from Only Muriel voted for Hubert cannot depend on the contingency of a pragmatic feature like the felicity condition of an assertion in a context of utterance. Furthermore, on the analysis of (15b) If one adopts the representation in (15a), the claim that Muriel voted for Hubert is assertorically inert stands a chance of being non-trivial, but then the arguments of Horn (1969 Horn ( , 1979 Horn ( , 1992 and of Atlas (1991 Atlas ( , 1993 against any conjunctional analysis of Only Muriel voted for Hubert would seem to come into play. As I have argued (Atlas 1991 (Atlas , 1993 y ( y voted for Hubert  (y=m) ). As I discussed in Atlas and Levinson (1981: 42-3) , utilizing ideas of Putnam (1958) and Popper (1959: 122) , No one distinct from Muriel voted for Hubert, which does not entail Muriel voted for Hubert, is about the set of voters for Hubert (Popper) or about the union of the set of voters for Hubert with the set of nonMurielizers (Putnam The problem for Horn's pragmatic analysis is to explain what the "conjunction" of an unasserted sentence with an asserted sentence actually means. It is easy to understand the assertion of a full conjunction of individually unasserted sentences: --(A & B). It is possible to understand the "conjunction" of two speech-acts (F 1 (P 1 )  F 2 (P 2 )) as the concatenation of two illocutionary acts of assertion, --A  --B, as a temporal sequence of speech-acts. It is less easy to see how to "conjoin" or concatenate a propositional content with an assertoric act, i.e. it is not easy to see what such a heterogeneous "conjunction" would mean. Thus the representation in (15a) seems to be a way of having the negative proposition as the statement's truth-conditions, and then adding, "By the way, the statement Only Muriel voted for Hubert entails Muriel voted for Hubert."
The essential claim of Horn's pragmatic theory of the licensing of NPIs by Only  Fs is now this: (16) Downward asserting, not downward entailing, operators license NPIs.
For example, Only  is downward asserting (but why not also entailing?), since its asserted content is No one distinct from , which Atlas (1996: 304) notes is anti-additive and so semantically negative (see Zwarts 1996 , 1998 , Atlas 2001 ).
Thus Horn ( , 2005 Horn ( , 2006 tries to have it all. Admitting the entailment and non-monotonicity claims of Atlas (1991 Atlas ( , 1993 Atlas ( , 1996 Atlas ( , 1997 , he preserves the downwardness of Only  by using the diagnostics of Karttunen and Peters (1979) for the distinction between truth-conditions and presupposition, now understood as a distinction between "what is said" (asserted) and what is not asserted. What was once pragmatically presupposed (Horn 1979 (Horn , 1992 ) is now entailed but not asserted.
As a pragmatic solution to the problem of NPI licensing that Horn sets himself, this is a clever idea. I certainly cannot object to this pragmatic, speech-act emphasis on assertion, since notes that in passing I made similar observations in Atlas (1991 Atlas ( , 1993 , though I did not anticipate Horn's use of the ideas. His new pragmatic analysis returns to the ideas and data of Horn (1992) . He returns to Karttunen and Peters's (1979) data and analysis, now couched in terms of assertion and non-assertion.
The data of (12) It is clear that an assertion of (17a) does not just mean (17c). The data of (13) The data of (17) and (18) are counter-examples to the kind of analysis that the data of (12) and (13) suggested to Horn, Karttunen, and Peters.
Another example that used to support the Karttunen-Peters analysis of "what is asserted" is a sentence with almost VP, which he believes has a foregrounded component "close to VP" and a backgrounded component "not VP." For example, an assertion of (19a) is plausibly understood by Horn (2002:73) to mean (19b) not (19c) .
(19) a. I just discovered that my cat almost proved Fermat's Last Theorem.
b. I just discovered that she "came close to" proving it. c. I just discovered that she did not succeed.
But the opposite intuition obtains in example (20a), asserted by a mathematician whose speciality is algebraic geometry and who has discovered the subtle error in Wiles's first proposed proof given by him in a colloquium in Cambridge. In this context an assertion of (20a) does not just mean (20b).
(20) a. I just discovered that Andrew Wiles almost proved Fermat's Last Theorem. b. I just discovered that Andrew Wiles "came close to" proving it. c. I just discovered that Andrew Wiles did not succeed.
Horn believes that (21a), when asserted, has the utterance-meaning (21b) but not (21c). To the contrary, it seems linguistically obvious that an assertion of (21a) does not have just the utterance-meaning of (21b).
(21) a. I just took a survey of the White House, and I discovered that only Hillary trusts Bill. b. I just took a survey of the White House, and I discovered that no one distinct from Hillary trusts Bill. c. I just took a survey of the White House and I discovered that Hillary trusts Bill.
The point is that, for every example that seems to support a Karttunen-Peters diagnostic for an assertion's utterance-meaning being just a foregrounded component of its sentence-meaning and a component of its sentence-meaning not being asserted, one can, with a little ingenuity, construct an example with no such component of sentence-meaning exhausting the utterance-meaning of the assertion. But Horn has one further linguistic argument in defense of his pragmatic analysis.
Horn claims that a given speaker cannot felicitously re-assert or question what he/she has just asserted. For example, (22a) and (22b) are illocutionarily odd.
(22) a. # The cat is on the mat, but the cat is on the mat.
b. # The cat is on the mat, but is the cat on the mat?
Horn finds (23a) acceptable and (23b) unacceptable, which he takes as evidence that Only Hillary trusts Bill asserts No one distinct from Hillary trusts Bill, just as he interprets the assertion of (24a) to be (24b) and so purports to explain the alleged illocutionary anomaly of (23b) just as he does (22b). (23) 
Conclusion
The arguments do not seem to support the view that Horn's constraint on acceptable assertion and Karttunen and Peters's use of epistemic or emotive factives show that, when asserted, Only  Fs has the negative proposition No one distinct from  Fs as its foregrounded utterance-meaning and the affirmative proposition  Fs assertorically backgrounded. Horn reformulates his pragmatic account of  Fs in Only  Fs as an account of a non-assertion, by contrast with the truth-conditions or the asserted utterancemeaning No one distinct from  Fs. Horn attempts to resolve the dilemma of how a semantically non-monotonic Only  can still be "negative" in order to license NPIs, while allowing an entailed  Fs , by hypothesizing a downward monotonic assertoric content of Only  Fs. Unfortunately his pragmatic account crucially relies on Karttunen and Peters's (1979) observations, which, when re-couched as criteria for distinguishing assertions from non-assertions, do not seem, in general, to be correct.
Even were Karttunen and Peters's criteria, so re-cast, sound, there would still remain (a) the theoretical question why it should be necessary for the grammatical occurrence of NPIs in a sentence that the sentence be asserted and (b) the task of constructing a theory characterizing the unasserted, entailed, and asserted components in the representations of utterance-meanings.
If one cannot rely on Karttunen and Peters's version of an account of the assertoric meaning of "presuppositional" utterances, and the arguments like Horn's ( , 2005 Horn's ( , 2006 ) that essentially rely upon it, the semantic analysis that I had proposed in Atlas (1996) and the treatment of assertoric force that I gave in Atlas (1991) still seem to me to do justice to intuitions about speech-acts and to logical intuitions that we have about the entailments of only NP sentences. Horn's pragmatic theory of NPI licensing in only sentences is the best "negative" theory there is -it's a genuine pragmatic advance. But it needs another defense than the pragmaticizing of Karttunen and Peters's (1979) criteria for presupposition into criteria for un-assertion.
